A recent study introduced a vaccine that controls Ebola Makona, the Zaire ebolavirus variant that has infected 28,000 people in West Africa. We propose that even such successful advances are insufficient for many emergent diseases. We review work hypothesizing that Makona, phenotypically similar to much smaller outbreaks, emerged out of shifts in land use brought about by neoliberal economics. The epidemiological consequences demand a new science that explicitly addresses the foundational processes underlying multispecies health, including the deep-time histories, cultural infrastructure, and global economic geographies driving disease emergence. The approach, for instance, reverses the standard public health practice of segregating emergency responses and the structural context from which outbreaks originate. In Ebola's case, regional neoliberalism may affix the stochastic "friction" of ecological relationships imposed by the forest across populations, which, when above a
threshold, keeps the virus from lining up transmission above replacement. Export-led logging, mining, and intensive agriculture may depress such functional noise, permitting novel spillovers larger forces of infection. Mature outbreaks, meanwhile, can continue to circulate even in the face of efficient vaccines. More research on these integral explanations is required, but the narrow albeit welcome success of the vaccine may be used to limit support of such a program.
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Is a Vaccine Enough?
Preliminary results indicate that researchers have developed a successful vaccine against Ebola Makona, the Zaire ebolavirus variant underlying the regional outbreak in West Africa. 1 A cluster-randomized ring vaccination trial of nearly 8,000 people across Guinean location and ring size found all contacts and contacts of contacts vaccinated immediately after confirmation of a new case went uninfected. In contrast, 16 cases emerged in those rings vaccinated 21 days after an index case.
Good news, indeed, even should the vaccine prove less effective in subsequent clinical testing. Vaccines are a fundamental public health intervention when not ensnared in market failures, which are as effective a barrier to the availability of health technologies as any anti-vaxx campaign. 2, 3 A series of mergers and acquisitions have left only four pharmaceutical companies-GlaxoSmithKline, Sanofi-Pasteur, Merck, and Pfizer-producing vaccines for diseases other than influenza, primarily for developed markets. 4 With little competition, many such vaccines are overpriced and effectively unavailable in the poorest countries. [5] [6] [7] The Ebola vaccine trial in West Africa was funded as a noncommercial effort by the World Health Organization, Wellcome Trust, Me´decins Sans Frontie`res, and the Norwegian and Canadian governments.
There is an adjunct danger in the latter success. Vaccination is based on a molecular model of disease etiology. Such thinking is necessary, of course. Viruses and immunity interact at the molecular level, even as they also do so pleiotropically, cognitively, and across multiple physiological systems. 8, 9 For a broad constituency, however, a successful vaccine implies the approach is also sufficient. [10] [11] [12] [13] An ebullient Nature editorial, 14 for instance, charges: tracks-the same strategy that was used to eradicate smallpox in the 1970s. This means that this vaccine can, in principle, be deployed immediately to help to end the Ebola epidemic in West Africa. As aptly conveyed by the trial's French name, 'Ebola, c¸a suffit!' ('Ebola, that's enough!'), it is time to finish the job.
If only diseases responded to such heroic appeals to consequences alone. Many intractable pathogens, among them HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis, act decidedly unlike smallpox and other diseases that respond to the reductionist model of intervention. 15 In a world in which viruses and bacteria evolve in response to humanity's multifaceted infrastructure-agriculture, transportation, pharmaceuticals, public health, science, politics-our epistemological and epidemiological intractabilities may be in fundamental ways one and the same.
The more socioecologically complex pathogens can evolve into population states that even the most well-intentioned researchers fail to parse, if by dint of the demands of research and development alone. 16, 17 Models of biology and the economic doctrine under which they are produced are often tightly intertwined, down to their mathematical formalisms. 18, 19 Many pathogens, meanwhile, plot their own paths, deriving solutions to interventions at one level of biocultural organization with adaptations at another. 20 As a result, pathogen evolution routinely fails to cooperate with market expectations and scientific hypotheses alike.
Neoliberal Ebola
Ebola offers an archetypical example of such a disjunction between method and medical phenomenon. The Makona variant appears conventional in its phenotype, if one could say so of such a dangerous pathogen, with a typical case fatality rate, incubation period, and serial interval. 21 The virus had been spilling over in the region for years. Schoepp and colleagues 22 found antibodies to multiple species of Ebola in patients in Sierra Leone as far back as five years ago, including to the Zaire species from which the outbreak variant evolved. Phylogenetic analyses, meanwhile, show the species Bayesian-dated in West Africa as far back as a decade. 23, 24 Hoenen and colleagues 25 showed the outbreak variant as initially possessing no molecular anomaly, with nucleotide substitution rates typical of Ebola outbreaks across Africa, even as Makona would phylogeographically diversify and adapt, largely by antigenic drift. [26] [27] [28] As we raised last year, 29 these results beg an explanation for Ebola's ecotypic shift from intermittent forest killer, taking out a village here and there, to a protopandemic infection infecting 28,000 people and killing 11,000 across the region, leaving bodies in the streets of capital cities Monrovia and Conakry. 30 Even with contagion presently below replacement, the outbreak continues. Many of the thousands who survived infection suffer longterm symptomatic sequelae, including eye disease, hearing loss, arthralgia, anorexia, difficulty sleeping, and post-traumatic syndrome disorder, and, as documented in one recent patient, they can pass on the virus by sexual transmission. [31] [32] [33] [34] Some commentary has noted the structural adjustment to which West Africa has been subjected in the past decade, including the kinds of divestment from public health infrastructure that permitted Ebola to incubate at the population level once it spilled over. 35, 36 The effects, however, extend farther back in the causal chain. The shifts in land use in the Guinea Forest Region from where the Ebola epidemic first emerged were also connected to neoliberal efforts at opening the forest to global circuits of capital. It appears that although Ebola did not fundamentally change, West Africa had. 37 Bausch and Schwarz 38 characterize the Forest Region as a mosaic of isolated populations of a variety of ethnic groups that hold little political power and receive little social investment. The forest's economy and ecology are also strained by thousands of refugees from civil wars in neighboring countries. The region is subjected to the tandem trajectories of accelerating deterioration in public infrastructure and concerted efforts at private development that dispossesses small holdings and traditional foraging grounds for mining, clear-cut logging, and increasingly intensified agriculture.
The Ebola epicenter is located in the larger Guinea Savannah Zone, which the World Bank describes as "one of the largest underused agricultural land reserves in the world." 39 Continental Africa hosts 60% of the world's last farmland frontier. The Bank sees the Savannah as an opportunity best developed by market commercialization, if not solely on the agribusiness model. As the Land Matrix Observatory 40 documents, such prospects are in the process of actualization. The Observatory lists 90 deals by which United States-backed multinationals have procured hundreds of thousands of hectares for export crops, biofuels, and mining around the world, including multiple deals in sub-Saharan Africa. The Observatory's online database shows similar land deals contracted by other world powers, including the United Kingdom, France, and China.
Under the newly democratized Guinean government, the Nevada-based and British-backed Farm Land of Guinea Limited secured 99-year leases for two parcels totaling nearly 9,000 hectares outside the villages of N'Dema and Konindou in Dabola Prefecture, where a secondary Ebola epicenter developed, and 98,000 hectares outside the village of Saraya in Kouroussa Prefecture. 41 The Ministry of Agriculture has now tasked Farm Land, Inc. to survey and map an additional 1.5 million hectares for third-party development. While these as of yet undeveloped acquisitions are not directly tied to Ebola, they are markers of a complex, policy-driven phase change in agroecology that our group has hypothesized undergirds Ebola Makona's emergence. 29 In an effort to connect this broader context to data accumulating about the epizoology of Ebola and the ecology of its hosts, we centered our thesis on palm oil. Natural and semi-wild groves of different oil palm types have long served as a source of red palm oil in the Guinea Forest Region. 42, 43 Forest farmers have been raising palm oil in one or another form for hundreds of years. Fallow periods allowing soils to recover, however, were reduced over the 20th century from 20 years in the 1930s to 10 by the 1970s, and still further by the 2000s, with the added effect of increasing grove density even should no new plots break ground. Concomitantly, semi-wild production has been increasingly replaced with intensive hybrids, and red oil replaced by, or mixed with, industrial and kernel oils.
Other crops are grown in the forest. 43, 44 Regional shade agriculture includes coffee, cocoa, and kola. Slash-and-burn rice, maize, hibiscus, and corms of the first year, followed by peanut and cassava of the second year and by a fallow period, are rotated through the area. Lowland flooding supports rice. In essence, the region has long been characterized by a move toward increased intensification without private capital in the technical sense while still remaining classifiably agroforest.
Even this passing juxtaposition has since been transformed. The Guinean Oil Palm and Rubber Company (with the French acronym SOGUIPAH) began in 1987 as a parastatal cooperative in the Forest, but since has grown into a state company. 42 SOGUIPAH is leading efforts that began in 2006 to develop plantations of intensive hybrid palm for commodity export. The company economized palm production for the market by forcibly expropriating farmland, which to this day continues to set off violent protest. During the outbreak itself, a medical team dispatched by SOGUIPAH to educate locals about Ebola and distribute chlorine was met with stones and briefly taken hostage in Bignamou, Yomou, on the Liberian border. 44 Trust and its collapse are critical epidemiological variables. 46 International aid accelerated forest industrialization. SOGUIPAH's new mill, with four times the capacity of one it previously used, was financed by the European Investment Bank. 47 The mill's capacity ended the artisanal extraction that as late as 2010 provided local populations full employment. The subsequent increase in seasonal production has also led to harvesting above the mill's capacity and operation below capacity off-season, leading to a conflict between the company and some of its 2,000 now partially proletarianized pickers, some of whom insist on processing a portion of their own yield to cover the resulting gaps in cash flow. Pickers who insist on processing their own oil during the rainy season now risk arrest.
The new economic geography instantiates a classic case of land expropriation and enclosure, turning a tradition of shared forest commons toward expectations that informal pickers working fallow land outside their family lineage obtain an owner's permission before picking palm. 47, 48 Out of the new agricultural regime an archipelago of oil palm plots has emerged in and around the Gue´cke´dou area, the outbreak's apparent ground zero. 29 The characteristic landscape is a mosaic of villages surrounded by dense vegetation and interspersed by crop fields of oil palm and patches of open forest and regenerated young forest. The general pattern can be discerned at a finer scale as well, west of the town of Meliandou, where the index cases of the new Ebola appeared.
The landscape may embody a growing interface between humans and frugivore bats, a key reservoir for Ebola, including hammer-headed bats, little-collared fruit bats, and Franquet's epauletted fruit bats. [49] [50] [51] Shafie and colleagues 52 document a variety of disturbance-associated fruit bats attracted to oil palm plantations. Bats migrate to oil palm for food and shelter from the heat, while the plantations' wide trails permit easy movement between roosting and foraging sites. As the forest disappears, multiple species of bat shift their foraging behavior to the food and shelter that are left.
Bushmeat hunting and butchery are one means by which subsequent spillover may take place, but agricultural cultivation may be enough of a mechanism. Anti and colleagues 53 report more than a third of survey respondents in Ghana were bitten by bats, scratched, or exposed to bat urine. Plowright and colleagues 51 characterize bat roosting structures as conducive to indirect transmission of viruses by droplets or aerosols and warn that continual exposure "may lead to a high probability of infection." Fruit bats in Bangladesh transmitted Nipah virus to human hosts by urinating on the date fruit that humans cultivated. 54 Even transmission by hunting may be dependent upon agriculture if by second-order effects. Leroy and colleagues 55 report that not long before a village outbreak, large-scale hunting of Ebola-prone bats along the Lulua River in the Congo took place among the palm trees of a massive abandoned plantation that bats had been visiting for half a century.
Sae´z and colleagues 56 have since proposed the initial Ebola spillover in Guinea occurred outside Meliandou when children, including the putative index case, caught and played with Angolan free-tailed bats in a local tree. The bats are an insectivore species also previously documented as an Ebola virus carrier. As we describe in a manuscript presently under review, 57 whatever the specific reservoir source, shifts in agroeconomic context still appear a primary cause. Previous studies show the free-tailed bats also are attracted to expanding cash crop production in West Africa, including of sugar cane, cotton, and macadamia. [58] [59] [60] Indeed, nearly every Ebola outbreak to date appears connected to capitaldriven shifts in land use, including logging, mining, and agriculture, back to the first outbreak in Nzara, Sudan, in 1976, where a British-financed factory spun and wove local cotton. [61] [62] [63] [64] When Sudan's civil war ended in 1972, the area rapidly repopulated and much of Nzara's local rainforest-and bat ecology-was reclaimed for subsistence farming, with cotton returning as the area's dominant cash crop. 65, 66 As if to punctuate the point, hundreds of bats were discovered roosting in the factory itself where several workers were infected.
Structural One Health
Clearly such outbreaks are embedded beyond shifts in local ecologies brought about by the actions of specific companies in specific countries. Causality extends in space and scope. By a Structural One Health, we can determine whether the world's circuits of capital as they relate to husbandry and land use, producing pronounced interconnections across the globe, are related to disease emergence. 17 Some landscapes are enmeshed primarily within local circuits of production and exchange. Other landscapes produce traditional agricultural exports. But maps by Bergmann and Holmberg 67 show calculations of the percentages of land (croplands, pasturelands, and forests) whose harvests are effectively consumed abroad, not only directly as agricultural goods, but also indirectly as manufactured goods and services. Further, they show how West African forests and fields are much more globalized when viewed from the perspective of the largely foreign capital investment and accumulation they directly and indirectly support, even when compared to the many overseas consumers to whose lives they contribute.
In presenting updated maps of global livestock, Robinson and colleagues 68 report, As [agricultural] production intensifies, it becomes increasingly detached from the land resource base (for example, as feeds are brought in that are grown in completely different places) and thus more difficult to predict based on spatial, agroecological variables. The effect is particularly marked for chickens and pigs, where the locations of intensive farming units often have more to do with accessibility to markets or to inputs of one sort or another, than to the agro-ecological characteristics of the land that can be quantified through remotely sensed variables.
If landscapes, and by extension their associated pathogens, are globalized by circuits of capital, the source of a disease may be more than merely the country in which the pathogen first appeared. As a matter of methodological completeness, we need to identify which sovereign wealth funds, state-owned enterprises, governments, and private equity-companies, developers, mutual funds, banks, pension funds, hedge funds, university endowments, and equity funds-finance the development and deforestation leading to disease emergence in the first place. 17 The implications are more than technical in nature, however. Such an epidemiology begs whether we might more accurately characterize such locales as New York, London, and Hong Kong, key sources of capital, as disease "hot spots" in their own right. Diseases are relational in their geographies, which are never confined to the borders of a "hot zone." 69, 70 The new approach speaks to the nature of public health campaigns. The current Ebola response appears largely organized around segregating emergency operations and broader structural interventions (e.g., ref. 71 ). Emergency responses are critical, of course, but such logistics are an indirect, if perhaps in most cases unintended, means by which to avoid addressing the greater foundational contexts driving the emergence of diseases. That is, however critically unaware its practitioners, the omission serves as an ideological design feature partial to the present political and economic orders.
The philosopher Istva´n Me´sza´ros 72 differentiates between episodic or periodic crises resolved within the established global framework and foundational crises that affect the framework itself. In the latter structural crises, unfolding in an epochal fashion through the very limits of a given order, the systemic contradictions start to accumulate in such a fashion that none can be adequately addressed. Beyond ill-defined references to "upstream" causes (e.g., ref. 73) , we need instead to explicitly acknowledge that many of our emergencies, pathogens among them, arise from the very structural apparatus called upon to respond.
Forest Background Front and Center
A second false dichotomy divides pathogen and outbreak from their contextual fields. In Ebola's case, the deterministic effects of the pathogen and its evolution are treated as if divorced from the forest's ecosystemic noise-the sum of chance encounters among the various agroecological actors in the region. The reality is much more complicated, with networks of causes highly interlinked and conditional in time, space, and direction. The ostensible "background" of the forest from which Ebola and other pathogens emerge may in fact be a front-and-center explanation for the outbreak.
A simple stochastic differential model of exponential growth in pathogen population N can include the "noise" of stochastic ecological interactions across and within species imposed by the complexity of the forest 29,74 :
where 4 0 is a characteristic rate constant for exponential growth, an index of "noise" strength, and dW H t represents a fractional white noise process with index 0 5 H 5 1. H ¼ 1 2 marks ordinary white noise. The noise is defined by a covariance relationship across time and space:
An Ito expansion produces a classic result in population growth:
When below a threshold, 0 5 H 5 1 2 for 4 0, the noise exponent is small enough to permit a pathogen population to explode in size. When above the threshold, for instance H ¼ 1 2 and 2 4 2, the noise is large enough to control an outbreak, frustrating efforts on the part of the pathogen to string together a series of susceptibles to infect above replacement.
The formalism implies that under certain conditions, the forest acts as its own epidemiological protection and that we risk the next deadly pandemic when we destroy that capacity. When the forest's functional noise is stripped out, the epidemiological consequences are explosive.
Control efforts are similarly impacted. Much public health intervention, by vaccine or sanitary practices, aims at lowering an outbreak below an infection's Allee threshold. 75 A pathogen, unable to find enough susceptibles to sustain itself, can be maneuvered into burning out on its own. But in this case, commoditizing the forest may have lowered the region's ecosystemic threshold to such a point that no emergency intervention can drive the Ebola outbreak low enough to burn out on its own. Novel spillovers suddenly express larger forces of infection. On the other end of the epicurve, a mature outbreak continues to circulate, with the potential to intermittently rebound (e.g., ref. 76) .
In short, neoliberalism's structural shifts are no mere background on which the emergency of Ebola takes place. The shifts are the emergency as much as the virus itself. Changes in land use brought about by policy-driven transitions in ownership and production appear to be fundamental contributions to explaining Ebola's area-specific emergence. Deforestation and intensive agriculture may strip out traditional agroforestry's stochastic friction, which typically keeps the virus from lining up enough transmission.
We can formalize the connections between economy and epizoology more explicitly. Members of our group inductively modeled the effects of environmental stochastic noise on the resulting financial costs of an outbreak for industrial livestock on the one hand and agroecological production on the other. 57 We adapted the Black-Scholes 77 approach to option pricing in finance to modeling the cost in resources needed to control epizootic outbreaks under the two models of production.
Our model shows the costs are dependent on a constant of proportionality dampening the environmental noise. If the constant is effectively zero, as occurs under agroforestry, then the cost of epidemic control grows only as the log of the policy-driven stochasticity. If the constant exceeds zero, as occurs under most industrial production, then the cost will be dominated by linear growth in the stochasticity. In short, the overall financial costs of an outbreak-including direct and opportunity costs-are dependent upon the impacts of agroeconomic policy on environmental stochasticity. The inherently explosive epizoologies of commodity agricultures-however biocontained-appear exorbitantly expensive as a first principle.
While the contention requires field testing, the Ebola outbreak in West Africa is suggestive. Bartsch and colleagues 78 estimate the direct societal costs of all cases in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone through mid-December 2014 ranging from $82 million to $356 million (all dollar amounts in U.S. dollars).
The Political Will for a Research Way
To test these various hypotheses, we could combine remote sensing, demographic data, and trade data to spatially project the risk of another outbreak across Africa's Guinea Savannah Zone. By a number of spatial approaches, including potential surface analyses, we could project Ebola zoonotic risk across the Zone based on a number of socioecological factors, including host reservoirs, health infrastructure, human population density and mobility, shifts in land use, and globalized capital accumulation and consumption across local croplands, pasturelands, and forests, with a particular emphasis on how those factors may have evolved over time.
We could develop historical political-economic studies for the areas identified by the projection models to be at risk for novel Ebola outbreaks. Each risk area is characterized by its own place-specific social and agroeconomic trajectories. Working through local communities and supporting agencies, we could make site visits to locales already affected by outbreaks and, once the risk maps have been produced, to areas projected to be of the gravest risk. While such site visits have been previously made for Ebola, none to date has done so incorporating the broader global agroeconomics at the heart of the changes in land use behind disease spillover. Neither have such visits been made to areas of projected risk.
The question remains, however, whether in the face of current research imperatives there exists the political will to fund a project undergirded by such a set of premises. Concepts of pathogen biology can act as both a spur to and a brake upon new interventions in public health. Unwittingly or not, the new Ebola vaccine is presently applied as much as a proverbial inoculation against discussing the problems of neoliberalism's impacts upon deadly pathogens as it is a welcome addition to public health's arsenal. 13 At bottom, the two conditions are a false equivalence in practice and proposition. Blocking Ebola with a vaccine does not make the social context driving Ebola's circulation disappear. Indeed, ignoring the latter condition increases the likelihood the vaccine will fail at any number of levels, from the molecular to the socioeconomic. 9, 15, 79 As Ebola and other pathogens evolve out from underneath our passing technicist responses, the agroeconomic matrix, a global specter, looms as the critical cause the health sciences are leaving largely unaddressed. That needn't be the case.
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